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Risk advantages and information acquisition 
Thomas R. Palfrey* 
In some competitive situations under uncertainty, less risk averse competitors have an 
advantage over more risk averse opponents. Private information acquisition by the 
advantaged players diminishes this advantage by reducing the risk faced by their op-
ponents in a Nash equilibrium. This tradeoff between risk advantages and informational 
advantages is examined in the context of a duopoly model with uncertain demand. It 
is found that private information acquisition may reduce the risk advantage by so much 
that the overall effect is to make the informed, less risk averse competitor worse off 
and the uninformed, more risk averse competitor better off 
1. Introduction 
• In recent years the comparison of economic behavior in environments which differ 
by the amount of private information possessed by different decisionmaking agents has 
been a topic of much concern. One of the more interesting observations that has been 
made is that private information not only is capable of producing market inefficiencies 
but may also be damaging to the agent possessing the information. This occurs in sig-
nalling models (Spence, 1974) and in adverse selection models (Akerlof, 1970; Wilson, 
1978), and is a feature in game-theoretic models of limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1979), in general principal-agent problems (Green and Stokey, 1981), and in other 
settings (Ponssard, 1976). 
A common thread that runs through these examples of detrimental private infor-
mation is that public actions reveal an agent's private information. The other strategic 
participants in the market (players in the game) can then use this information in a way 
that leaves the player possessing private information worse off than would have been the 
case if there had been no private information. The typical scenario proceeds as follows: 
one player observes some private information, takes an action, and then the player who 
does not have private information (or has less information) makes a decision contingent 
on the informed player's action. Because the uninformed player can observe the informed 
player's action before selecting an action of his own, he is able to deduce, perhaps 
imperfectly, what the informed player's information is. Hence, in equilibrium the in-
formation is not completely private. 
The purpose of this article is to explore a different class of games in which private 
information is harmful. First, the implicit sequencing of actions is not a critical element; 
both players move simultaneously and neither player's actions are contingent on the 
other's. Second, what is important is that the two players have different risk attitudes, 
and private information possessed by one player affects (in equilibrium) the risk faced 
by the other player. 
In a number of games with uncertain payoffs, players who are less risk averse than 
their opponents will receive higher payoffs in equilibrium than will their more risk averse 
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opponents. 1 This risk advantage may vary with the degree of all players' risk aversion 
and the amount of risk the players confront. If any player gains private information, 
this may reduce the risk in the distribution of equilibrium payoffs to all players. This 
will benefit the more risk averse players and may harm the less risk averse players. If 
one of the less risk averse players gains private information, he will gain an informational 
advantage over the other players, but it is quite possible that this advantage will be offset 
because of the reduction of risk faced by the opponents. In these situations there is a 
tradeoff between informational advantage and risk advantage. 
This principle is illustrated by examining a simple Cournot duopoly game with 
demand uncertainty. Two competing firms share identical technologies and prior beliefs 
about the market demand curve for their product. They differ only in their attitudes 
toward risk. Two situations are compared. In the first both firms are equally informed 
about demand; in the second the less risk averse firm has perfect information about 
demand. 
2. The model 
• The game studied is a static model of duopoly with uncertain demand in which the 
two competing firms independently and simultaneously make output decisions to max-
imize expected utility of profits. Each firm can produce unlimited quantities of a good, 
x, with no fixed cost and constant marginal cost, c > 0. The demand curve for x is linear: 
a 1 
x(p) = b - b p, a> 0, b > 0. 
The slope (b) of the inverse demand curve is known to both firms, but the intercept 
(a) is unknown. The distribution of a is common knowledge to both firms. The distribution 
function, F(a), is strictly increasing on some real interval [A, B], B > A, and has the 
following properties: 
Assumption 1: F(A) = 0, F(B) = 1; 
Assumption 2: Fis continuously differentiable on [A, B] and denote f = F'; 
Assumption 3: 0 < M 1 ~ f(a) ~ M 2 < oo for all a E [A, B]; and 
Assumption 4: A > 2c. 
The last two assumptions are made for technical convenience. Assumption 3 facilitates 
the analysis of limiting behavior when a firm becomes extremely risk averse; Assumption 
4 will assure that, regardless of firms' risk attitudes, both firms will produce positive 
output in equilibrium. 
Two separate informational situations are examined. In the first, the symmetric 
information game, each firm must choose an output level before observing a. In the 
second, the asymmetric information game, firm 1 observes demand perfectly before 
making a production decision, but firm 2 must still produce before observing a. 
Profits of firm 1 are denoted by ?r 1 = [a - b(x 1 + x 2) - c ]x1 and profits of firm 2 
are denoted ?rz = [a - b(x1 + x2) - c ]x2• Each firm maximizes expected utility of profits, 
where their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are u1(7r1) and uz(?r2), respec-
tively. 
D Symmetric game. Each firm chooses an output level to maximize expected utility of 
profits, given an output level chosen by the opponent firm. An equilibrium is defined as 
1 This is a feature of some bargaining models. See, for example, Sobel (1981). 
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a pair of outputs xr' xf such that xr is the expected utility maximizing output choice 
of firm 1 if firm 1 predicts that firm 2 will choose xf, and vice versa. It should be pointed 
out that the only asymmetry in the model introduced so far is that the two firms in 
general may have different utility functions. 
Because neither firm is able to observe the realization of a, a, before choosing a 
level of output, the equilibrium choices of each firm do not depend on a, but only on the 
distribution of a. The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the two reaction 
curves obtained from the following two maximization problems. 
Firm 1: 
max J0 u1{[a - b(x1 + x2) - c]xi}f(a)da. 
XJ A 
Firm 2: 
Solving for the reaction functions yields the following two equations which, assuming 
second-order conditions are satisfied, implicitly characterize the equilibrium: 
xr=2lb JB BaU'1{[a-b(xr+xf)-c]xn f(a)da-bxf-c (1) 
A i U11{[t - b(xr + Xf} - cJxnf(t)dt 
Xf = 2lb JB B au2{[a - b(xr + xn - cJxn f(a)da - bxr - C (2) 
A i u2{[t - b(xr + Xf} - cJxnf(t)dt 
o Asymmetric game. In the asymmetric information game, firm 1 observes a before 
making an output decision. Thus, for any predicted level of output by firm 2, firm 1 may 
choose different levels of output depending on a. While firm 2 still has a strategy that 
is constant across all states of the world (i.e., all possible realizations of a), a strategy 
of firm 1 is now a function x 1(a) which maps realizations of a into output choices. 
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium for this game is defined in a similar manner as before. 
Each firm is assumed to choose a strategy (output function for firm 1, output level for 
firm 2) to maximize expected utility, given a predicted strategy chosen by the other firm. 
Note that firm l's prediction about firm 2's strategy is an output level, while firm 2's 
prediction about firm l's strategy is an output function. The equilibrium is a pair 
[.X1( • ), .X2 ] such that .X1(a) is the utility maximizing choice of firm 1 if firm 1 predicts 
firm 2's strategy is x2 and the outcome of the random variable is a; and .X2 is the expected 
utility maximizing choice of firm 2 if firm 2 predicts that firm l's strategy is .X1( • ). 
Firm l's problem is to choose Xi, given X2 and the realization of demand, a, to 
maximize u1[(a - b(x1 + x2) - c)xi]. This is equivalent to maximizing profit since 
u1 is increasing. Firm 2's problem is to choose x 2, given x 1( • ), to maximize 
f~ u2{[a - b(x1(a) + x2) - c]x2}f(a)da. The reaction functions for the two firms, which 
together characterize the equilibrium, are: 
1 
.X1(a) = 2b [a - bx2 - c] (3) 
J 8 u2{[: - b(.X1(a) + .X2) - c].X2}[a - b.X1(a)] f(a)da _ c . 
A i u2{[t - b(x1(t) + .X2) - c]x2]f(t)dt (4) 
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A number of observations can now be made. First, it is an advantage to a firm to 
be less risk averse than the opponent firm in the symmetric information equilibrium. The 
reason for this is as follows: Suppose we define firm 2 as being more risk averse than 
firm 1 if and only if u2 is an increasing concave transformation of u 1• It follows from 
a result in Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) that an increase (decrease) in a duopolist's risk 
aversion will cause a downward (upward) shift of his reaction curve. In the resulting 
equilibrium, that duopolist will have a lower (higher) output and his opponent will have 
a higher (lower) expected utility. In this sense the less risk averse duopolist has a risk 
advantage over the more risk averse duopolist. A firm is better off the less risk averse 
it is and the more risk averse its opponent is. 
The second observation is that, ceteris paribus, a firm with a risk averse opponent 
is better off in equilibrium the more risk his opponent must face. This follows because 
given the structure of payoffs, greater risk induces a risk averse firm's reaction curve to 
shift downward. 
Third, the equilibrium solution in the symmetric information game is a function of 
the risk attitudes of both players, while in the asymmetric information game it is a 
function only of the risk attitude of the uninformed player. Fourth, in the symmetric 
information game, players' strategies are unresponsive to true demand, while in the 
asymmetric information game the informed firm's output is positively correlated with 
demand. 
From the first and third observation one can see that the less risk averse firm no 
longer enjoys the full beneficial strategic effects of its own risky behavior if it is informed, 
since its risk attitudes no longer affect its behavior. Furthermore, from the fourth ob-
servation one can see that an informed player reduces the risk faced by his opponent 
(since the informed player's own strategy is now correlated with demand). Since a firm 
competing against a risk averse opponent prefers his opponent to face more risk rather 
than less, this is detrimental to the informed firm. 
Naturally, information about demand is useful to the firm in other ways, but to a 
sufficiently less risk averse firm the loss in its original risk advantage may more than 
offset the new informational advantage. This is demonstrated in two "extreme" ex-
amples below. 
Example A: Firm 1 is risk neutral, firm 2 is a maximiner. 2 The equilibria for the two 
games are, respectively,3 
( 2ii - A - c 2A - ii - c) (xr' xn = 3b ' 3b 
(
3/ a - V2A - c A - c) (xi(cl), .X2) = 2 3b ' ~ . 
Since firm 1 is risk neutral, it is better off in the game that yields the highest expected 
profit. The expected profit to firm 1 in the symmetric information game is (2ii - A 
- c)2/9b and in the asymmetric game it is f~ (3/ia - 1/2A - c)2f(c)dc/9b. The first 
expression is greater than the second for a wide variety of distributions (for example, 
if a is symmetrically distributed around ii). 
Example B: Firm 1 is a maximaxer4 and firm 2 is risk neutral. Assume ii > (B + c) / 
2. The equilibria of the two games are, respectively: 
2 Firm 2 maximizes its minimum profit (i.e., the profit it receives if a = A). 
3 The expected value of a is denoted ii. 
4 Firm I maximizes its maximum profit (i.e., the profit it receives if a = B). 
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( 2B - ii - c 2ii - B - c) (xr' xn = 3b ' 3b 
a- 20-c a-c ( 3'/ A IV: - - ) (.X1(d), .X2) = 2 3b , 3b . 
Since firm 1 is a maximaxer, it is better off in the game that yields the highest profit 
when a = B. Maximum profit (when a = B) to firm 1 in the symmetric information 
game is (2B - ii - c)2/9b and in the asymmetric information game it is (3/zB - V2ii 
- c )2 /9b. Since B > ii, firm 1 is better off uninformed, regardless of the distribution of 
demand. 
The intuitive arguments as to why information might hurt the informed, less risk 
averse firm also suggest that the more risk averse firm may prefer to play against an 
informed firm since that reduces the risk the more risk averse firm faces. This is illustrated 
below, using Examples A and B above. 
In Example A, firm 2's minimum payoff is 
1 
71" 2 = 9b (2A - ii - c)2 
if firm 1 does not gather information, and it is 
1 7rz = 9b (A - c)2 
if firm 1 does gather information. Since c < A < ii, 71"2 < 7rz, so that firm 2 is better off 
if firm 1 gathers information. 
In Example B, firm 2's expected utility is just its expected profit which is 
1 
71" 2 = 9b (2ii - B - c )2 
if firm 1 does not gather information, and it is 
1 -7rz = 9b (a - c)2 
if firm 1 does gather information. Since c < ii< B, 71"2 < 7rz, so that firm 2 is again better 
off if firm 1 gathers information. 
In the foregoing examples, one of the firms had risk preferences that were extreme, 
so extreme that they could not be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function. These preferences were used so that the solutions to the examples would be 
as simple as possible. Thus, it is important to note that the same conclusion, that the 
value of full information to the more risk averse firm can be negative, can be reached 
if less extreme risk preferences are used. In Example A, if firm 2 was not a maximiner 
but was still very risk averse, then a similar result would obtain. This would be the case 
if firm 2 had a utility function of the form uz( 71") = -e-"' for sufficiently large r, since 
maximining behavior is the limit of very risk averse behavior. Similarly, in Example B, 
if firm 1 was very risk preferring (i.e., "almost" a maximaxer ), then a similar result 
would obtain. Thus the value of information can be negative when both agents have 
standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. A more formal argument is con-
tained in an appendix, which is available from the author upon request. 
3. Discussion 
• This article has shown that in some competitive environments free, private, fully 
appropriable information may not be valuable if it changes the risk faced by the other 
players. Precisely which environments constitute this set is an open question. 
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Several points were made, however, that suggest that these findings apply, beyond 
the simple model of duopoly presented here, to a wide variety of economic games in 
which it is advantageous to impose risk on one's opponents and in which there is an 
advantage to playing against more risk averse opponents. Along similar lines, in situations 
in which it is advantageous not to impose risk on the opponent or in which one is better 
off facing less risk averse opponents, the effects could be reversed. That is, the more risk 
averse players would sacrifice a risk advantage when they became informed. 
In many economic problems, for example, the study of auctions, games with incom-
plete information are used as a technique for analyzing equilibrium behavior. In such 
games, the risk attitudes of the players play an important role in affecting the equilibrium. 
Analysis usually proceeds by assuming, often for reasons of "analytical convenience," 
that players have risk neutral or at least identical risk preferences. This article suggests 
that relaxing these convenient assumptions will lead to some interesting and different 
conclusions, particularly regarding incentives for information acquisition. 
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